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COMMENTAIRE
CANADA'S NEW IMMIGRATION ACT:
AN AFFRONT TO THE CHARTER
AND CANADA'S COLLECTIVE CONSCIENCE?
par Mark Anthony DRUMBL*
Cet article examinera la constitutionnalité du paragraphe 46.01(1) et
du sous-alinéa 19(1)(c.1)(i) de la Loi sur l’immigration. Le paragraphe 46.01(1)
prévoit que sont désormais exclus du processus de détermination du statut de
réfugié au Canada tous ceux qui sont passés par un tiers pays «sûr» pour
arriver  au Canada, à la seule exception de ceux qui ne s’y trouvaient qu’en vue
d’un vol de correspondance. En vertu de l’art. 19(1)(c.1)(i), toute revendication
du statut de réfugié au Canada est irrecevable si l’intéressé a commis une
infraction criminelle dans son pays d'origine.  L’auteur soutient  que ces
dispositions  violent les garanties procédurales de justice fondamentale prévues
à  l'article 7 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. De plus, il soulève
la possibilité que les droits conférés aux articles 11(d), 11(g), 12, 14 et 15(1)
sont également enfreints par la Loi sur l’immigration. Ensuite, il aborde la
question de savoir si ces violations constituent des limites raisonnables au sens
de l’article premier de la Charte. Etant donné que les questions relatives à la
politique d’immigration se trouvent actuellement  au centre de nos débats de
société, il devient de plus en plus difficile de maintenir l'équilibre entre les buts
de la Loi  et les obligations imposées sur le Canada par la Charte et par la
Convention des nations unies relative aux réfugiés. Malgré cette difficulté,
l'auteur suggère plusieurs façons par lesquelles la Loi  peut être amendée pour
respecter cette équilibre.
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This essay explores the constitutionality of sections 46.01(1) and
19(1)(c.1)(i) of the federal Immigration Act. These sections empower immigra-
tion officials to exclude from the refugee determination process any claimant
who has arrived in Canada via a «safe» third country or who has been
determined to have committed a criminal offence in the home country, unless the
claimant falls into several narrow exceptions provided by the statute. The author
submits that these provisions violate the procedural requirements of fundamen-
tal justice guaranteed by section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. A further investigation is made as to whether these statutory
provisions offend the specific rights provided by sections 11(d), 11(g), 12, 14
and 15(1). As well, the essay addresses the question as to whether ss. 46.01(1)
and 19(1)(c.1)(i) can constitute reasonable limits under Charter section 1.
Ultimately, the author proposes several suggestions as to how these sections can
be amended so as to ensure that they attain their policy objectives while
respecting both the Charter and the United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees.  As immigration issues are increasingly thrust into the
public policy arena, maintaining this balance could become problematic, yet
nonetheless important.
Canada's new Immigration Act :
(1994) 24 R.D.U.S. an affront to the Charter and 387
Canada's collective conscience?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
B. POLITICAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
C. CHARTER  ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
I. THE «SAFE THIRD COUNTRY» PROVISIONS . . . . . 394
SECTION 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
SECTION 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
SECTION 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
II. THE «PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD» PROVISIONS . . 415
III. BEING PART OF AN «ORGANIZATION ENGAGED
IN ESPIONAGE, SUBVERSION OR TERRORISM» . . 421
IV. JUSTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE
CHARTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
a) SAFE THIRD COUNTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
i) CO-ORDINATED INTERSTATE
APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
ii) EXPEDITING AND STREAMLINING
THE PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
b) PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD AND
SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . 429
D. FILLING THE VOID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
E. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
Canada's new Immigration Act :
388 an affront to the Charter and (1994) 24 R.D.U.S.
Canada's collective conscience?
Canada's new Immigration Act :
(1994) 24 R.D.U.S. an affront to the Charter and 389
Canada's collective conscience?
1. Third Session, Thirty-Fourth Parliament, 40-41 Elizabeth II, 1991-92.
2. It took effect on February 1, 1993.
3. Some statistics might be helpful. In 1991, 14,495 Convention Refugees were admitted into
Canada as government sponsored refugees; another 3186 were privately sponsored; the
median age was in the 25 to 29 bracket: Immigration Canada, Immigration Statistics, 1991,
Ministry of Supply and Services, 1992. 
4. A note on the writing style of the essay. In order to reflect gender neutrality and encourage
stylistic cogency, this essay will randomly alternate third person references in the masculine
and feminine pronouns instead of the «s/he» or «her/his» constructions.
5. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982
c. 11 [hereafter the Charter].
6. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177; 58 N.R. 1  [hereafter Singh].
A. INTRODUCTION
On December 17, 1992, An Act to Amend the Immigration Act and Other
Acts in Consequence Thereof  (Bill C-86)1 received royal assent.2   Bill C-86
significantly  changes Canada’s immigration law by making it more difficult for
refugees to process their claims in Canada.3 In fact, the amendments empower
the Senior Immigration Officer (the front line state agent in the immigration
process) to expel a claimant who falls into certain categories created by the law.
The most significant barriers to having one’s claim heard in Canada are
found in ss. 46.01(1) and 19(1)(c.1)(i) of the amended Act. Section 46.01(1) 
stipulates that any refugee arriving at Canada’s borders through a «safe third
country» will automatically be denied a refugee determination hearing in
Canada and will be returned to that safe third country. Section 19(1)(c.1)(i)
mandates a Senior Immigration Officer (SIO) to exclude from Canada any
refugee claimant who has committed a criminal offence in his/her4 home
country.  The only restriction on the scope of 19(1)(c.1)(i) is that the offence be
recognized in Canada. Moreover, this section operates in conjunction with s.
19(1)(e) which excludes from the Canadian refugee determination process any
member of an organization which is reasonably believed to be involved in
terrorist activity.
 
This essay will analyze the constitutionality of these provisions in light
of the broad protection of human rights enshrined in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms5. Ever since the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration6, it has been recognized
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7. The jurisprudence holds that sections 2 and 7 to 15 clearly apply to such persons.
Nevertheless, there is political opposition to such a position. For example, during the
political campaign leading up the the October 25, 1993 federal election, the Reform Party
indicated that it would consider enacting a policy that would remove Charter protection
from immigration claimants: «A vote for Canada's future», Montréal Gazette, Wednesday
October 20, 1993, p. B2. 
8. Thanks to Susan MacDonald, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, for this point. 
that Charter rights vest in any individual physically present in Canada.7  Charter
rights thus inure in all refugee claimants on Canadian soil, whether their entry
to Canada was legal or not. This essay will argue that Bill C-86 not only violates
a refugee claimant’s constitutional rights, but also the right guaranteed to
refugees by international covenants not to be sent to a place where one’s life or
security would be threatened.
Attention will not only be focussed on the legal issues involved, but also
on the broad array of political interests that operate within the domain of
immigration policy. Canada’s acceptance of its international responsibility to
mitigate the plight of involuntary migrants was recognized in 1987 when the
international community awarded the Canadian people the  Nansen medal for
outstanding achievements on behalf of the world’s refugees.8  In so far as Bill
C-86 curtails our international responsibilities, its philosophical underpinnings
must be questioned.
The potential Charter  ss. 7, 12 or 15 violations created by the  safe third
country and the prior criminal record provisions shall be separately considered.
Subsequently, this essay shall discuss whether either set of provisions can
constitute a reasonable limit under section 1. In short, it seems that the effect of
the prior criminal record provisions is more likely to violate the Charter than
those related to the safe third country. The Charter right most susceptible to
violation is the s. 7 guarantee of procedural fairness. It is less clear whether
these provisions inflict «cruel and unusual treatment» on a claimant; neverthe-
less, interesting questions arise whether the fact that they significantly increase
the risk of such treatment being inflicted can in and of itself violate section 12.
If the impugned sections of Bill C-86 are deemed unconstitutional, this essay
proposes that judicial initiative can reword these provisions  to give effect to the
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9. Hansard, 132:163 at 12533, June 22, 1992.
10. A nascent version of the reforms eventually promulgated in Bill C-86 is contained in
Refugee Perspectives, 1987-88, Refugee Affairs Division, (Ottawa: The Division, 1988).
Bill C-86 was itself first introduced in the summer of 1992, and passed through the three
Parliamentary readings fairly quickly, not for want of debate, but rather because the
government limited the time available to discuss the proposed legislation. 
11. The Hon. Flora MacDonald, the then Minister of Employment and Immigration, announced
in Parliament on November 23, 1984 that «...le gouvernement [veut] réexaminer la Loi de
l'immigration et les niveaux d'immigration»: Hansard, Volume 1 (1984) at 533. And, at 408,
in a discussion of the reevaluation of immigration quotas for 1985, she stated that: «Nous
entendons examiner en profondeur la politique d'immigration...nous nous pencherons donc
sur  les niveaux d'immigration en fonction des besoins de notre pays», (November 20, 1984).
12. For example, «...the government is also proposing to streamline administrative procedures
involved in issuing or renewing documents for visitors, students and returning residents»,
John Shields, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Employment and Immigration,
Hansard, 132:163 at 12505, June 22, 1992.
13. Hon. Bernard Valcourt, Minister of Employment and Immigration, in Hansard, 132:180  at
13911, November 24, 1992.
rights of refugee claimants as well as to promote the legitimate policy objectives
behind the Act. 
B. POLITICAL BACKGROUND
«Quite frankly, Canadians are fed up with people trying to beat the
system. This Bill addresses that frustration in Canadian society.»9
-- Hon. Doug Lewis, Former Solicitor General
Bill C-86 is the product of many years of discussion, committees and
legislative drafting.10 When the Progressive Conservatives assumed a majority
government in 1984, they pledged to revamp Canada's immigration system.11
Their vision  -- which animates not only Bill C-86 and regulations made thereto,
but also other legislation12 -- rests on three pillars.13 Firstly,  Canada must strive
to make a «better selection» of candidates for immigration through closer
monitoring  of categories and numbers of immigrants. Secondly, the immigra-
tion system should be imbued with more stringent control mechanisms to protect
Canada's domestic security and guard against abuse of social services. Lastly,
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14. Hon. Jean Corbeil, Minister of Transport, in Hansard, 132:163 at 12497, June 22, 1992.
15. Donn Downey, «Canada to tighten immigration laws», Globe & Mail, May 26, 1993, p. A4.
16. Most notably Warren Allmand and Dan Heap, respectively the Liberal and NDP immigration
policy critics.
17. Hansard, 132:180  at 13911, November 24, 1992.
the immigration and refugee determination systems should be streamlined in
order to render fair decisions more quickly.
Thus, it is clear that  reform of the refugee determination system is not
the main priority of Bill C-86.  Instead, the focus is on reducing immigration to
Canada. Certain regulations  already passed under the new Immigration Act
serve the dual function of reducing the number as well as diversity of immi-
grants. The government  seeks wealthier and better educated immigrants:
«[We need] a renewed emphasis on the independent and business
class immigrant whose skills, talents and acumen are so necessary to
our economic prosperity.»14
In order to attain this goal, the «education regulation» was passed in
May 1993.15 In order to be admitted as an independent immigrant, a claimant
must now obtain 70 points out of 100 on the Ministry's new test. A university
degree is worth 15 points, and knowledge of English or French nets an
additional 15 points. A candidate without a secondary school degree receives no
points; a claimant with no proficiency in either English or French also receives
no points.
The scope of who can qualify as a refugee claimant has also been
narrowed. Reducing the number of refugees is seen to support the policy goals
behind Bill C-86  since refugees generally have less education, English/French
skills and financial resources than immigrants from «safe» countries.  
When Opposition members16 suggested that Bill C-86 was unnecessarily
harsh, Conservative Ministers often responded that Canadians had to establish
«better control over [our] immigration and refugee programs».17 References
were frequently made to international criminals who allegedly enter the country
due to the laxness of Canadian immigration requirements. Another popular
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18. John McDermid, Minister of State (Finance and Privatization): «There have been some
problems with fraud, not only in the immigration end of things but from that it goes into
welfare fraud...», Hansard, 132:163 at 12502, June 22, 1992. This vision has also partly
animated the recent decision by the Liberal government to issue special identification cards
for immigrants. 
19. Hansard, 132:163 at 12496, June 22, 1992.
image was that of the refugee who fraudulently weighs down Canada's  welfare
system.18 Although an open-door immigration policy may once have been
acceptable, many proponents of Bill C-86 now feel it is no longer so. As voiced
by Jean Corbeil, Minister of Transport:
«Much has developed in the sixteen years since the Immigration Act
was passed...global political and economic conditions are far from
stable...the system was not designed to withstand the pressures exerted
on it by the realities of the 1990's.»19
Such is the political background to Bill C-86. A discussion of the
constitutionality of its refugee determination provisions shall demonstrate that
much of the discourse supporting the legislation is flawed. Although there are
some legitimate policy objectives (and this essay will try to flesh these out), they
are often lost in a sea of rhetoric. The social and economic problems currently
plaguing Western societies  cannot be blamed on newcomers and refugees.
Doing so obfuscates the real issues at hand and reduces the effectiveness of
potential solutions.
C. CHARTER  ANALYSIS
The relevant sections of the Charter  are as follows:
7.   Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamen-
tal justice.
11.      Any person charged with an offence has the right
(d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to  law in a
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;
Canada's new Immigration Act :
394 an affront to the Charter and (1994) 24 R.D.U.S.
Canada's collective conscience?
(g) not to be found guilty on account of any act or omission unless, at the
time of the act or omission, it constituted an offence under Canadian or
international law or was criminal according to the general principles of law
recognized by the community of nations.
12.  Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment.
14.  A party or witness in any proceedings who does not understand or speak the
language in which the proceedings are conducted has the right to the assistance
of an interpreter.
15(1). Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
I. THE «SAFE THIRD COUNTRY» PROVISIONS
S. 46.01(1) provides that a person who claims to be a Convention
Refugee is not eligible to have the claim determined by the Refugee Determina-
tion Division if:
«(b) [the person] came to Canada, directly or indirectly, from
a country, other than a country of the person’s nationality or,
where the person has no country of nationality, the country of
the person’s habitual residence, that is a prescribed country
under paragraph 114(1)(s).»
It is only when the SIO deems a person eligible that her claim will
actually be heard by the Refugee  Division. Thus, the major obstacle to a
determination of the merits of a claim is this initial decision by the Senior
Immigration Officer. In this sense, the safe third country provisions (as well as
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20. In the government’s view, these legislative amendments will allow the most meritorious
claims to proceed as quickly as possible: Refugee Affairs Division, Refugee Perspectives,
1987-88, (Ottawa: The Division, 1988), p. 36.
21. The U.S.A. is a  safe country under s. 114(1)(s). See note 76.
22. The burden of proving eligibility rests on the applicant: S. 45(4) of the Act to Amend the
Immigration Act. The Immigration Act  contains another provision, section 8(1), which reads
as follows:  «Where a person seeks to come into Canada, the burden of proving that he has
a right to come into Canada or that his admission would not be contrary to this Act or the
regulations rests on him.»
23. 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (No. 2545)  [hereafter the Geneva Convention or Convention.]
24. S. 114(8): «The Governor in Council shall take the following factors into account...». Within
the context of legislative drafting, «shall»  can be considered to be a permissive term, unlike
«will», «is to», or «must». 
the prior criminal record ones) constitute screening devices geared to reducing
the number of claims actually heard by the Refugee Division.20
The only exception to s. 46.01(1)(b) is contained in s. 46.01(3)(a) which
provides that a person who is in a country solely for the purposes of joining a
«connecting flight» to Canada shall not be considered as coming to Canada from
that country. The combined effect of these provisions is as follows: if a
Convention refugee arrives in Canada after spending one week in Chicago, he
will not be able to have his claim determined in Canada but will be sent by the
SIO back to the United States21 unless she is satisfied22 that  the one week stay
was for the purposes of a connecting flight.
It is clear that an individual expelled under the safe third country
provisions is not being returned to his home country. Instead, he is being sent
to face a refugee determination hearing in his first country of arrival, as long as
the Canadian government prescribes that country to be «safe» under the
definition found in section 114(1)(s).  Under s. 114(1)(s), the Minister classifies
countries as «safe» using the list of criteria found in  s. 114(8).  The criteria are
as follows: (1) is the country a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees23; (2) are its policies and practices in
compliance with Article 33 of the Convention, which provides that no claimant
is to be sent to a place where her security of the person shall be threatened; and
(3)  does it possess a progressive human rights record? These, however, are
guidelines and not mandatory requirements.24 Thus, a country can fail to satisfy
these criteria yet still be included on the list.
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25. The Preamble reads as follows: «Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly
heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which
the United Nations has recognized the scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without
international co-operation.»
26. The Convention's requirements are listed as policy objectives in ss. 3 and 53 of the Act.
27. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 502.
28. The major difference being that cruel or unusual treatment  can never comport with
fundamental justice unlike violations of life, liberty and security of the person. 
29. Chiarelli v. M.E.I., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711 at 735, per Sopinka J. [hereafter Chiarelli].
30. Id.
31. [1992] F.C.A.,  D. 1614-03.
The concept of returning a claimant to a «safe» place was enacted to
promote international co-operation in the area of refugee matters. While it is true
that the preamble to the Geneva Convention25 encourages a co-ordinated
interstate response to the influx of refugees, sending someone to a third country
might amount to the first step in returning that person to a dangerous place,
namely her home country. Bill C-86 does not preclude this possibility since it
does not require the Minister to receive assurances from the safe third country
that it will accord the expelled claimant a fair refugee hearing or even a hearing
at all.  This could violate Article 33 of the Geneva Convention, to which Canada
is itself a signatory.26
SECTION 12
 As held in the Motor Vehicle Reference27, section 12 is illustrative of
section 7 since «cruel and unusual treatment» is an example of a violation of
life, liberty and security of the person.28  Thus, since a statutory instrument may
not constitute cruel and unusual treatment yet still violate the liberty and security
of a person, it is opportune to first determine whether Bill C-86 infringes s. 12.
This essay shall only discuss whether Bill C-86 occasions cruel and
unusual «treatment», not «punishment». The reason for this is clear. The case-
law applying s. 12 to the immigration context has held that a deportation simply
does not amount to «punishment».29 Nevertheless, both the Supreme Court in
Chiarelli v. M.E.I.30 and the Federal Court of Appeal in Canepa v. M.E.I.31 have
indicated that a deportation or expulsion may come within the scope of cruel or
unusual «treatment».
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32. Schmidt  v.  The Queen et al. (1987), 39 D.L.R. (4th) 18 at 24-5 (S.C.C.).
33. 67 C.C.C. (3d) 1  [hereafter Kindler].
34. And fundamental justice under  s. 7.  
35. Kindler, supra, note 33, at 9 (per McLachlin J., L'Heureux-Dubé J., and Gonthier J.)
36. Consult note 43.
37. Mattia v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1987), 25 Admin L.R. 80 (F.C.T.D.).
The crux of the matter involves the following question:  how can sending
someone back to face a refugee determination hearing in a safe third country
constitute cruel and unusual treatment? A caveat must be drawn:  since the
Charter does not have extraterritorial application, it is the act taken by the
government of Canada that must be cruel and unusual, not that of a foreign
government.32
The jurisprudence on the constitutionality of Canada's extradition
procedures indicates how s. 12 is to be applied to the actions of foreign
governments on individuals benefitting from Charter protection. In R. v.
Kindler33, an individual  convicted of murder in the United States escaped to
Canada after having been sentenced to death by a Pennsylvania court.  The
Supreme Court of Canada held that it would not amount to cruel or unusual
treatment  to extradite him to face capital punishment. The test adopted by the
majority of the court was that s. 1234 would be violated if  extraditing someone
would «shock the Canadian conscience».35 Extraditing Mr. Kindler was
determined neither to «shock the Canadian conscience» nor «offend the
Canadian sense of what is fair, right and just.» 36
Under the Kindler test  the Canadian conscience could be shocked by
directly returning bona fide Convention refugees to face imprisonment, torture
or death.37 At first blush, Bill C-86 seems to preclude such a situation since any
claimant (if at all expelled) will only be returned to a «safe» country. However,
a closer examination of the legislation reveals that it in fact significantly
increases the risk that legitimate claimants will face just such a deleterious
result.
As stipulated by section 114(7), the Minister is required to review the list
of «safe» countries every two years and either add or remove countries at her
discretion. It is here that a fundamental problem arises. Although the Minister
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38. Cheema  v.  Canada (M.E.I.) (1991), 15 Imm. L.R. (2d) 117 (Fed. T.D.).
39. Consult Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488 (D.C. California) [infra, note 72]
as well as this essay's discussion of how Bill C-86 violates the life, liberty and security of
refugee claimants. 
40. [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 at 505.
is supposed to monitor the countries on the list, a country may  becomes
«unsafe» and a claimant  sent back to that country before the Minister changes
its status. Directly expelling a claimant to such a country could shock the
Canadian conscience.  
Given the volatile political climate in many countries, such a possibility
is far from remote.  In fact, it has already come before the courts. In Cheema38,
a claimant was denied Convention Refugee status.  A deportation order was
issued against him. The claimant then supplied evidence that the political
conditions in his native Punjab had deteriorated from the time of his arrival to
Canada to the date on which his claim was rejected. He argued that his
application for Convention status should thus be reassessed. The Federal Court
ruled that deporting the claimant violated his Charter rights since he was denied
a hearing at which to present evidence of these «changing political conditions».
The application of section 114 to the eligibility determination is equally heavy-
handed, as the claimant is given no opportunity to present any evidence at all
whether the country to which he is being directly sent by Canada is actually safe
for him. Many third countries may be «safe» for certain classes of refugees yet
not for others.39
Nor is the claimant given a chance to explain why he left that third
country in the first place.  The Supreme Court, in R. v. Goltz, underscored the
fact that any characterization of treatment as cruel or unusual should begin
«from the perspective of the person actually subjected to [that treatment]».40 By
precluding the articulation of this perspective, s. 46.01(1) violates Charter
section 12.
On another note,  the «safe» country may have policies that  deny the
individual a fair refugee determination hearing.  It  would «offend the Canadian
sense of what is right, fair or just» to send a claimant to a country without
assurances that its officials will accord him a fair hearing before returning him
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41. «Lack of U.S. safe-haven accord dulls teeth of new immigration law», Peggy Curran of the
Montreal Gazette (January 21, 1993).
42. Decisions are to be characterized by their effects and consequences. The results of the SIO's
decision are serious:  it is not uncommon for denied claimants to be summarily executed
upon their forced return to their home countries. In fact, in recent years Canada has returned
several claimants to Iran to face death. This decision to return has consequences more
serious than any criminal decision in Canada. If we are willing to attribute «penal» status to
a Provincial Court Judge's determinations of fraud, assault and shoplifting, why should we
hesitate to  ascribe (in the least) the same status to the SIO's decision?  
43. Cruel and unusual treatment is determined by different approaches depending on the
particular context in question. It appears that there is no definitive test as to what constitutes
cruel and unusual treatment, just a variety of mutually inclusive standards to be used with
an eye to the specific facts involved. 
to a potentially dangerous home country. Yet the Act  does not require such
assurances in order for a country to be deemed «safe». It should be noted that,
in the time leading up to the enactment of Bill C-86, the Canadian government
attempted to negotiate a «safe-haven» pact with U.S. authorities in order to
ensure that any person denied a hearing in Canada and returned to the United
States would be guaranteed a hearing by American officials.41 The negotiations
fell through. Until such agreements are actually passed with every country
placed on the list in section 114(1)(s),  the safe third country provisions shall
remain unconstitutional.
Although in Kindler the lack of any assurance that the fugitive would not
receive the death penalty was not deemed to violate section 12, the situation of
Mr. Kindler is distinguishable from that of refugee claimants. In Kindler the
Supreme Court emphasized  that administering capital punishment to an
individual convicted of murder after a fair trial was not per se cruel and
unusual. In the case of the amended Immigration Act, it is difficult to see how
our collective conscience would not be shocked by imposing the risk of severe
punishment upon a refugee without having had the merits of her claim even
discussed.
Given the quasi-penal42 consequences of the SIO's decision, an
examination of the s. 12 jurisprudence in the criminal context is useful to help
define the meaning of «shock the conscience» in immigration matters. In the
domestic criminal context, treatment is cruel and unusual if it is  so excessive
as to outrage standards of decency.43 This test was first developed by Laskin
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44. Cited in R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 at 1072,  per Lamer J. 
45. Goltz, supra, note 40, at 499. This case involved the decision that a penalty of seven days'
imprisonment and a fine of $300.00 for a first conviction for driving while prohibited did
not infringe s. 12. 
46. Id.
47. A  logical extension of the argument would be that procedural concerns ought only  to be
discussed under s. 7.
48. In making such an argument, the Ministry would have to circumvent the conclusion of La
Forest J. in Kindler, supra, note 33, in which he held at 4 that  «...certain punishments
imposed following surrender, such as torture, would be so outrageous to the values of the
Canadian community that surrender would be unacceptable.»  La Forest J. therefore
distinguishes capital punishment from torture. Although the logic of such a distinction could
be perceived as tenuous, it is found in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.  Thus, even
on a direct application of Kindler, sending an individual to face torture, even if twice-
removed from Canada,  would shock our collective conscience. 
C.J.C. in Miller and Cockriell44 and has been applied within the context of
section 12 by the Supreme Court in Goltz.45  In Goltz, Gonthier J. adopted the
view that, in order to be «outrageous», there must be a gross disproportion
between the treatment and what would have been appropriate in the circumstan-
ces.46 Clearly, there is no proportionality between failing to satisfy an adminis-
trative requirement unrelated to the actual merits of one's refugee claim
(coming to Canada from a «safe third country») and expulsion from Canada,
given that this expulsion could result in torture or even death.
This discussion of Bill C-86 uncovers a broader issue:  within  Charter
jurisprudence there has been little discussion of the interplay between s. 12 and
procedural guarantees of due  process. A persuasive argument can be made that
since s. 12 prohibits cruel and unusual treatment per se, it should not matter
whether an individual has actually received due process  before being sent to
face such treatment.47 Thus, whether Mr. Kindler had a fair trial or not should
be simply irrelevant; what is relevant is that it did not violate section 12 to send
someone to face the death penalty at the hands of a foreign state.48 To this end,
the Ministry of Immigration could contend that, given Kindler as a precedent,
there is no way that s. 46.01(1) violates s. 12. The reply to this is that  a closer
reading of Kindler reveals that the Supreme Court did not separate s. 12 from
due process.
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49. The extent to which we extend s. 12 protection to refugee claimants in Canada is a difficult
issue for, if the protection is of a blanket nature, it could preclude Canadian authorities from
ever sending any claimant (no matter how unmeritorious) to any dangerous place. Would
this be too onerous for our immigration infrastructure? Perhaps. Yet, on the other hand, the
problem with including procedural guarantees in s. 12 is that  the scope of the protection
against cruel and unusual treatment could be watered down since the door is opened to such
treatment being permissible under certain circumstances.
50. First discussed in Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
51. R. v.  Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. 
52. Kindler, supra, note 33, at 6.
In fact, if the determinative test for a s. 12 violation is the Kindler
«shock the conscience» test, it seems that the Supreme Court has in fact created
room for procedural concerns within section 12.   For example, if two claimants
flee the same dangerous home country and Canadian authorities return one after
a thorough hearing reveals him to be a dangerous international criminal, this
may not «shock the conscience». Yet, turning away the second claimant without
any due process determination as to his bona fides could «shock the conscience»
even though both individuals would be subjected to the same treatment at the
hands of the state officials of the home country.49 Bill C-86 thus violates s. 12
since its inadequacy of procedural guarantees heightens the risk that cruel and
unusual treatment shall be inflicted on a bona fide claimant.
 Moreover, the arguments related to the lack of extraterritorial
application of the Charter are shortsighted since they run counter to the spirit of
the Charter  itself.50 The Charter's purpose is to protect individuals from the
effects of governmental intervention.51 This perspective was superimposed upon
the extradition context in Cory J.’s dissenting judgement in Kindler [italics are
mine]:
«The manner in which a foreign state deals with the fugitive upon
surrender may, in some situations, violate the Charter. When such a
likelihood arises, Canada must accept responsibility for the ultimate
consequence of the extradition. To argue   that the Charter protection
against cruel and unusual punishment does not apply because the
punishment is inflicted by [another] state is an indefensible abdication
of moral responsibility.»52
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53. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500 at 522.
54. 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (No. 2545).
55. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 120-1. 
56. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 at 1056-57.
A question arises as to whether giving the Charter extraterritorial
application imposes Canadian values on other  countries. This  concern has
animated the decisions of the Supreme Court  in extradition matters. In Canada
v. Schmidt, La Forest J.  emphasized that  the «judicial process in a foreign
country [cannot] be subjected to finicky evaluations against the rules governing
the legal process in this country [Canada]».53 It was held that Charter rights are
not universal, but relative to the Canadian context. For the most part, political
concerns such as promoting international comity lie at the heart of this
interpretative approach. 
However, the Charter could retain extraterritorial application when it is
called upon to uphold the one set of human rights that are truly universal:  those
enunciated in the various United Nations Conventions. Every refugee claimant
has the right under Article 32 of the  Geneva Convention  to be expelled to the
home country only with due process of the law.54 Although it is clear that
international covenants are not legally binding in Canada, Dickson C.J.C. held
in Oakes that those international covenants to which Canada is a signatory help
define the scope of Charter rights.55 In a subsequent decision, Slaight Communi-
cations v. Davidson,  the Supreme Court held that Canada's international human
rights obligations should inform the interpretation of Charter rights.56  This case-
law supports the argument that the Geneva Convention's guarantees could be
enforced through the Charter.  We cannot lose sight of the fact that, if there are
any individuals who are needy of a «large and liberal» interpretation of their
Canadian constitutional rights, it is those who do not have any rights at all in
their home country. 
There is another way in which the safe third country provisions might
inflict cruel and unusual treatment on a refugee claimant. In many cases a
claimant, even if he has the intention of making a new home in Canada, will be
unable to obtain a ticket to Canada from his home country. For example, let us
take the case of East European refugees or those fleeing the disintegration of the
former Yugoslavia. Due to financial or transportation limitations, a claimant
Canada's new Immigration Act :
(1994) 24 R.D.U.S. an affront to the Charter and 403
Canada's collective conscience?
57. The constitutionality of the «connecting flight» provision could perhaps be preserved if the
courts read in a definition of the term broad enough to cover situations such as this, where
claimants need to spend time in third countries for transportation, financial or other related
considerations. This approach is discussed in section D, infra. 
58. In Akthar v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1991), 14 Imm. L. R. (2d) 39 at 43, Hugessen J.A. of the
Federal Court of Appeal held that, within the immigration context, he «...might even be
prepared to concede that unreasonable restrictions touching the very fundamentals of human
existence might be found to constitute cruel or unusual treatment.»
59. Naturally, whether or not «human dignity» covers a choice as to where to immigrate or a
right to family unification is a question for the courts to determine. As the number of
involuntary migrants increases, this particular issue shall increase in importance.
60. «Repatriated Albanians 'tricked' by Italy», Globe & Mail, August 19, 1991, p. A1.
61. Id.
might only be able to take a train to Austria even though he has family or friends
in Canada and wants to settle here. If he purchases a ticket to Canada in Vienna,
he will be unable to have his claim determined in Canada since his original
place of entry was Austria, a «safe» country. Moreover, given the fact that
«connecting flight» is not defined in the Act, the Senior Immigration Officer will
likely use a «common-sense» definition of the term which does not include
tickets bought in a foreign country several weeks after the initial date of
arrival.57 If s. 12 is given a broad reading, it could deem it to be cruel or unusual
to force a claimant to have her claim adjudged in the first  safe country in which
she arrives, this often simply being  the result of geography and airplane
schedules.58 It must be remembered that  refugees are seeking more than just
temporary asylum, yet a permanent place where they can build a new life. The
«co-ordinated interstate response» policy should not be pushed to the point that
it infringes the principle of human dignity which lies at the heart of section 12.59
Yet another scenario demonstrates the unconstitutionality of Bill C-86.
In March and August 1991 thousands of Albanian refugees sailed across the
Adriatic Sea to seek asylum in Italy. The numbers were too large for the Italian
authorities to handle at once and many claimants had to be forcibly returned
without any refugee determination hearing.60 Although the Albanian government
indicated that some of the refugees would be pardoned, Italian authorities knew
that the subset of claimants who were completing military service (several
hundred) would, upon their return,  be charged by a military court with
desertion.61  To this end, when there is a particular glut of refugees to one «safe»
country, that country (such as was the case with Italy) might be forced to adopt
Canada's new Immigration Act :
404 an affront to the Charter and (1994) 24 R.D.U.S.
Canada's collective conscience?
62. Italy deported these claimants despite an appeal from the United Nations High Commissio-
ner for Refugees to accept the influx: Globe & Mail, March 9, 1991, p. A10. 
63. The International Helsinki Foundation affirms that, at the time of the influx to Italy,  about
200 political prisoners were incarcerated in Albanian jails, their only «crime» being to try
to emigrate. 
64. This does not necessarily mean the most favourable procedures imaginable, yet simply fair
due process as per international standards. 
65. It is important to bear in mind that ss. 7 and 12 are interconnected and that there is a certain
element of overlap between them. Thus, the contingencies discussed in the preceding section
can also be used as evidence of a potential section 7 violation. For purposes of brevity they
shall not be repeated here. 
a stricter admission policy than normal and  turn away  bona fide claimants such
as the Albanians in question.62 Under the provisions of Bill C-86, any claimant
in such a situation, if he were to have left Italy for Canada, would be promptly
returned to Italy by the Senior Immigration Officer even if she knew of the
situation in Italy. At that point, any such claimants would likely be returned to
Albania (a country known for its human rights abuses).63 The fact that there is
no discretion with regards to turning back a claimant opens the door to the
possibility that cruel and unusual punishment might ensue from the application
of the Act.
In sum, until the international community develops standardized and fair
refugee determination policies64 that will be applied consistently among all safe
third countries, the possible risks of refusing someone a merit-based hearing in
Canada could be serious enough to violate section 12. 
SECTION 7
The scope of «life, liberty and security  of the person» is  much broader
than «cruel and unusual punishment». Even if the impugned sections of the
Immigration Act do not violate section 12, they may still infringe section 7.65
The threshold question is whether the expulsion violates the claimant’s
«life, liberty and security of the person». In Singh, Wilson J. held that s. 7
«...must encompass freedom from the threat of physical punishment or suffering
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66. Singh, supra, note 6, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 117 at 207; 58 N.R. 1 at 55. In R. v. Morgentaler,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at 166, Wilson J. expanded her position and held that security of the
person covers the right of an individual to make important decisions related to her person
independently  of state intervention. An immigrant’s choice of migrating to a new home
could qualify  as such a decision. 
67. Akthar, supra, note 58, at 43. 
68. Morgentaler, supra, note 66, at 45. Consult also R. v. Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, per Lamer
J. In Collin v. Lussier, [1983] 1 F.C. 218 at 239, Décary J. of the Federal Court Trial
Division held that merely increasing a person's anxiety as to his state of health (based on the
possibility that the individual's health would in fact be placed in jeopardy) was sufficient to
trigger s. 7.
69. Singh, supra, note 6, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 117 at 260.
70. Of the 44,000 refugees presenting their claims in  Canada in 1992, roughly  15,000  came
via the United States. 
as well as freedom from such punishment itself.»66 Therefore, any decision that
exposes an individual to such a risk infringes his security of the person. The
SIO's decision could expose the claimant to the type of risk envisioned in Singh.
  Moreover, in Akthar v. Canada (M.E.I.) Hugessen J.A. held that merely
being placed in the refugee determination process puts in issue the claimant's
life, liberty and security of the person.67 Canadian courts have even held that
state-imposed psychological trauma constitutes an infringement of s. 7.68 This
line of reasoning has its origins once again in Wilson J.'s judgment in Singh, in
which she concluded that [italics are mine]: 
«To deprive [a refugee] of the avenues open to him under the Act  to
escape from the fear of persecution must, at the least, impair his right
to life, liberty  and security of the person.»69
The geographic patterns of involuntary migration help illustrate how Bill
C-86 violates the refugee claimant's right to life, liberty and security of the
person. Fully one-third of all individuals arriving at Canada’s borders through
safe third countries pass through the United States. To this end, the «safe third
country» turnaround provisions will mean that tens of thousands of claimants
will be returned to American authorities.70 Passing through the U.S. is a
transportation necessity for refugees arriving to Canada from Latin America.
This is cause for concern since the United States has a record of unfair treatment
of these refugees. American immigration practices related to Latin America have
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71. Catherine Torlai, «La politique des Etats-Unis d’Amérique relative aux refugiés et à
l'immigration: problèmes et solutions», in Dominique Turpin, ed. Immigrés et réfugiés dans
les démocraties occidentales: défis et solutions, (Economica: Paris, 1989) p. 189 at 194 and
195.  In effect, Convention  refugees have been found to be treated differently depending
solely on their national origin. For example, in 1983 the United States accepted 87% of
Soviet and 44% of Romanian refugee claimants yet only 3% of El Salvadorean and 2% of
Guatemalan claimants. 
72. 685 F. Supp. 1488 (D.C. California).
73. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council   (1993), 125 L Ed 2d 128 (U.S.S.C.). 
74. Passed through Executive Order 12807 which allows the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept
vessels on the high seas transporting passengers from Haiti to the U.S. and return such
persons to Haiti without first determining whether they might qualify as refugees.
75. Haitian Centers Council, supra, note 73, at 133. Stevens J. found that the actions of the U.S.
Coast Guard violated the «spirit of Article 33» and even of U.S. immigration legislation.
Nevertheless, neither applied to the Haitians in question since they were intercepted in
international waters. Furthermore, the Bill of Rights will not apply to any refugee claimant
illegally in the United States.
been found to be arbitrary and linked to the particular political or strategic
relationship the «home» country has with  Washington.71 
Examples of this unfairness are found in the facts of Orantes-Hernandez
v. Meese.72 In this case, the Federal District Court for California was presented
with evidence attesting to U.S. immigration practices that flagrantly violate the
terms of Article 33 of the Geneva Convention, to which the U.S. is a signatory.
El Salvadorean refugee claimants were routinely denied determination hearings
and were often coerced by U.S. authorities to sign «voluntary» deportation
consent forms.  Kenyon D.C.J. held that these claimants were entitled to the
protection of Article 33 and declared their «voluntary» deportation forms to be
void. Nevertheless, the effect of this decision has recently been diluted. In June
1993 the U.S. Supreme Court held  in Sale  v. Haitian Centers Council  that the
interception of Haitian ‘boat people’ (political as well as economic refugees)
and their forced return to Haiti was constitutionally permissible.73  Stevens J.
held that the government's actions74 contravened neither the Bill of Rights nor
Article 33 since neither have extraterritorial effect.75  The Supreme Court's
position is that Article 33 only applies to the domestic procedures by which the
Attorney-General decides which claimants might remain in the U.S.A.  Thus, if
Canada is to return a claimant to the U.S.A., American officials are not bound
by the terms of Article 33 until that person has already entered the U.S. refugee
determination system. U.S. officials are then free to keep that claimant «in orbit»
Canada's new Immigration Act :
(1994) 24 R.D.U.S. an affront to the Charter and 407
Canada's collective conscience?
76. Jack Shields, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Employment and Immigration: «The
United States I would consider a safe country under the refugee determination system. It has
proven that in the past. It has been a very generous country in the past.», Hansard, 132:163
at 12507, June 22, 1992.  Consult also Margaret Young, Canada’s Refugee Status
Determination System, Background Paper, Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch,
(Revised, September 1991) and  Arthur C. Helton, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights,
«Brief to the Legislative Committee on Bill C-86», August 1992. 
77. Motor Vehicles Reference, supra, note 27, at 487.
78. R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387; R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309.
79. Singh, supra, note 6, 58 N.R. 1 at 62-3. This principle was echoed by Cory J. in The Queen
v.  Wholesale Travel, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 at 226: «Context is relevant both with respect to
the delineation of the meaning and scope of Charter rights, as well as to the determination
of the balance to be struck between individual rights and the interests of society.» 
or return him  to the home country. Thus, given that it is politically improbable
that Canada would ever declare the U.S. to be an «unsafe» third country76,  the
life and security of those refugees «passing through» the United States is
especially threatened.
S. 46.01(1) cannot be deemed to infringe s. 7 merely because it deprives
a claimant of her security of the person. Section 7 will only be violated if the
specific deprivation is not made in accordance with fundamental justice.  As
outlined by Lamer J. in the Motor Vehicles Reference, fundamental justice has
both a substantive and a procedural aspect.77 It is difficult to conceive how the
perfunctory decision of the Senior Immigration Officer as to whether an
individual arrived from a «safe» third country for the purposes of a connecting
flight satisfies the threshold of procedural fairness mandated by section 7.
It is settled law that fundamental justice is to be contextually defined.78
In Singh it was concluded that the severity of the potential outcome should
determine the extent of the procedural protection within the decision-making
process.79 This case is of high precedental value due to the similarity of its facts
to potential situations that shall likely emerge under Bill C-86.
In Singh, legislation disentitling a refugee claimant to a full oral hearing
in an immigration re-determination proceeding was determined to be inoperative
due to its violation of fundamental justice.  Wilson J. concluded that, given the
seriousness of the outcome of the decision, the claimant must be able to state his
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80. Singh, supra, note 6, 58 N.R. 1 at 64.
81. Singh, supra, note 6.
82. The officer has the power to look at the arrivant’s travel documents, determine whether she
came from a «safe third country», decide if  the stop was for the purposes of a connecting
flight,  and immediately order her back.
83. Section 45(4) of the Immigration Act.
84. [1984] 2 F.C. 642 at 663.
case as well as know the case he has to meet.80 The effects of the Senior
Immigration Officer’s decision are just as far-ranging as those of the Immigra-
tion Board in Singh.  At best, the claimant will be exposed to a refugee
determination hearing in a country in which she has expressly chosen not to
settle.  At worst, the claimant could be eventually returned to face punishment
or death in the home country without any hearing at all.  Given the gravity of the
consequences,  the eligibility determination by the Senior Immigration Officer
should be encircled with procedural safeguards to at least allow the claimant to
be told the case against him and to be given a fair opportunity to respond.81
However, the Act  does not provide for a hearing, whether oral or written.82  A
section 7 violation is thus triggered.
 As explained earlier, the claimant is unable to present any evidence as
to why the «safe third country» might not be safe for him. In Singh, it was held
that oral hearings are mandatory when there is a serious issue of credibility or
when the determination will only be effective if the subject of the determination
can present «his side of the story». In the case of a refugee claimant, the
«safeness» of the third country  is a serious issues of credibility.
Furthermore, in what will likely be one of the most important determina-
tions in the claimant's life, no provision is made for any right to counsel. Even
though the onus of proving that one’s claim is eligible to be determined in
Canada rests with the applicant83, no allowance is made for legal advice to help
discharge the burden of proof. In Howard  v. Stony Mountain,  the Federal Court
held that the right to counsel emerges when a person is in a situation where the
consequences of a decision are severe and she might not have sufficient
«aptitude» to understand and present her case.84 Such a situation can easily arise
in the refugee determination process.
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85. (1993), 39 A.C.W.S. (3d) 501 (S.C.C.).
86. Richard Boivin, «La Charte permet l'examen secondaire d'un immigrant», The National,
August/September 1993, p. 40. 
87. Or French. Xie v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1990), 10 Imm.L.R.(2d) 284 at 107.
88. Such was the position of the Federal Court of Canada in Brar  v. Canada et al. (1989), 30
F.T.R. 284 at 300. It was held that immigration decisions fall under the rubric of s. 14
«proceedings». 
However, any argument that Bill C-86's failure to provide a  right to
counsel violates s. 7 must, in order to be successful, circumvent the March 1993
Supreme Court  decision in Dehghani  v. Canada (M.E.I.).85 In Dehghani,
Iacobucci J. held that fundamental justice does not require that a lawyer be
present at a preliminary meeting at which a claimant's status as a refugee is to
be determined. Nevertheless, Iacobucci J. was careful to point out that the
absence of a lawyer was only permissible because the meeting in question was
nothing more than a «routine information gathering»  session and not an actual
hearing. The Dehghani situation can therefore be distinguished from situations
that would arise under Bill C-86 in which claimants would be without counsel
at hearings during which the SIO would have the power to expel them from
Canada. In fact, at least one commentator on the Dehghani decision has noted
that, under Bill C-86, the absence of legal counsel at the «front-line» hearings
could violate s. 7 given the greater magnitude of these hearings than those at
issue in Dehghani.86
Even if the Charter may not require the provision of a lawyer at the
refugee determination hearing, it does mandate the presence of an interpreter.
Despite the fact that many claimants simply do not speak English87, the Act does
not  require the services of an interpreter when these claimants first meet with
the SIO. The entire expulsion process could take place without the claimant
comprehending any of the procedures nor the Immigration Officer being able to
understand anything the claimant has to say.  Along with infringing section 7 of
the Charter, this specifically denies the section 14 right to an interpreter  in any
«proceedings». The eligibility decision of the Senior Immigration Officer
certainly bears serious enough consequences on the claimant to qualify as  a
«proceeding» under the Charter.88
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89. [1992] 3 S.C.R. 165 at 195, per Gonthier J. [hereafter Hofer]. The main purpose of the
notice requirement is to ensure that the subject of the administrative decision can prepare to
defend himself or herself as well as better contribute to the discussion. 
90. 58 N.R. 1 at 65.
91. Whether refugee claimants should be assumed to have knowledge of the Canadian statutory
provisions is a contentious debate. On one side of the debate are those who maintain  that,
since ignorance of the law is no defence to a criminal charge, why should it operate within
the immigration context? Such was the reasoning of Décary J. in Metodieva v. Canada
(M.E.I.), (1991, F.C.J. No. 629 at 9). This position, however, ignores the fact that a refugee
claimant will have had far less access to the public record than any Canadian citizen charged
with a criminal offence. Perhaps a more straightforward position on this issue is that taken
by Vice-Chair Townshend of the Immigration Appeal Board in Crawford, infra, note 112,
at 20:
«This may sometimes be a harsh responsibility to place on a lay person, particularly someone
in a faraway foreign land. But in my view to derogate from that principle...is not an approach
which commends itself to me either in logic, fairness or practicality.»
Furthermore, under Bill C-86, the claimant will not have notice of the
exact case that shall be tendered by the SIO.  In its 1992 decision in Lakeside
Hutterite Colony v. Hofer, the Supreme Court of Canada held that notice is a
«most basic requirement» of fundamental justice.89 On a related note,  the
claimant is not entitled to discover the Minister’s case. In Singh, Wilson J. held
that «...as a matter of fundamental justice, a refugee claimant would be entitled
to discovery of the Minister's case».90 With Hofer and Singh as precedents, the
lack of notice and discovery contribute to a s. 7 violation.
Moreover, there is no sensitivity to the fact that a claimant may simply
be unaware of the conditions precedent for entry into Canada. The Ministry
assumes claimants to have knowledge of the requirements for admission into the
Canadian refugee determination process. This assumption seems unreasonable
given the fact that the claimant will be far removed from Canadian public
sources before choosing to come here.91  Although on its own the effects of this
assumption might not be sufficient to infringe s. 7, they serve as evidence that,
when coupled with the lack of counsel, interpreter, discovery  and hearing,
establish a Charter  violation.
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92. This seems to be a deliberate omission, since the Immigration Act allows claimants to appeal
the decisions of the Convention Refugee Determination Division, yet not the initial decision
of the Senior Immigration Officer that determines whether the claimant can address the
Division at all.
Aside from a judicial review application, the only avenue open to a  claimant  is to use
section 10(c) of the Charter to file a writ of habeas corpus in the court system, which is
practically impossible given the fact that the claimant shall likely be detained in an airport
(or a border crossing)  and will probably have no understanding of the intricacies of the
Canadian legal system. The main drawback with a judicial review application is that it
requires  leave of the court. Researchers have found that, in so far as the Federal Court of
Appeal is concerned, there is a great deal of arbitrariness with regard  to which applicants
are given leave. There are wide variations from judge to judge: I. Greene & P. Shaffer,
«Leave to Appeal and Leave to Commence Judicial Review in Canada's Refugee
Determination System: Is the Process Fair?»  (1992), 4 Int'l. J. Ref. L. 71.
93. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711. This case involved the expulsion of a permanent resident applicant to
Italy (his home country) for the reason that he had been convicted of violent crimes in
Canada. The deportation occured after his prison sentence in Canada had been served.
94. It is unclear whether «free access» includes access to the same courts Canadians may have
access to. There could be a conflict if «free access» is taken in its literal sense since this
means that refugee claimants could acquire access to courts normally inaccessible to
Canadians. 
95. Chiarelli, supra, note 93, at 733.
 There is no opportunity to appeal the decision of the Senior Immigration
Officer.92  Appeals form a key part of fundamental justice in so far as they
enable decisions to be reviewed and new evidence to be adduced. In the decision
of the Supreme Court in Chiarelli v. M.E.I., certain sections of the Immigration
Act  authorizing a deportation were determined to be constitutionally valid.93
Nevertheless, throughout the entire expulsion process, Mr. Chiarelli was
statutorily entitled to numerous discretionary rights to appeal the decision of the
Officer. These appeal guarantees were relevant to the constitutionality of the
deportation provision. The absence of any such right (even a discretionary one)
in Bill C-86 amounts to a denial of  fundamental justice to refugee claimants. It
also contravenes Article 16 of the Geneva Convention, which provides that a
refugee shall have free access to the courts of law on the territory of all signatory
states.94
In Chiarelli, Sopinka J. held that «...the Court must look to the principles
and policies underlying immigration law in determining the scope of fundamen-
tal justice.»95 He went on to add that the most fundamental principle of
immigration law is that non-citizens do not have an «unqualified right» to enter
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96. Id. See also Dehghani, supra, note 85.
97. Conclusion on the International Protection of Refugees Adopted by the Executive Committee
of the U.N.H.C.R., Programme no. 15, 1979.
98. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
99. Whatever intent or motive the government may have had in enacting the legislation is
irrelevant since, given  the decision of the Supreme Court in O’Malley  v.  Simpson-Sears,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 at 547, one does not need to find a discriminatory intent in order to
prove discrimination.
100. Andrews, supra, note 98, at 183; R. v. Turpin and Siddiqui, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 at 1332.
or remain in the country.96 Nevertheless, the Immigration Act must not qualify
this «right» by means not consonant with fundamental justice. In effect, Sopinka
J.’s comments deny the fact that there is an even more basic principle animating
immigration policy:   no-one shall be sent back to a dangerous place without the
benefit of a fairly  conducted merit-based hearing. It is United Nations policy
that no request for asylum be denied on the simple reason that the applicant
could have requested protection in another nation.97 Bill C-86 contravenes these
principles as well as the section 7 and 14 rights of refugee claimants.
SECTION 15
Not every distinction infringes the equality provisions of the Charter.
The appropriate test to determine which distinctions do violate  section 15 is set
out in Andrews  v.  Law Society of British Columbia98. There are two steps. The
distinction must have a differential impact that results in a denial of equal
benefit of or equal treatment before or under the law. Secondly, the distinction
must involve a prohibited ground of discrimination.99 There are two types of
prohibited grounds: those enumerated in section 15  and those  analogous to
these enumerated grounds. A  thread between these two categories is that they
frequently cover groups that have faced historical or structural disadvantage
which has, in turn, rendered them «discrete and insular minorities».100
The safe third country provisions create a distinction on the basis of
national origin: between refugees from countries with direct access to Canada
and those without. Members of the latter group (unless they fit into the
connecting flight exception) are denied  the protection the Immigration Act
accords refugee claimants directly arriving to Canada.
Canada's new Immigration Act :
(1994) 24 R.D.U.S. an affront to the Charter and 413
Canada's collective conscience?
101. Moreover, s. 46.01(1) also violates Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, which stipulates that
«...the provisions of this Convention [be applied] without discrimination as to country of
origin.» Although infringing an international covenant is not determinative of a Charter
violation, it is evidence leading to such an end.
102. In response to the s. 15 challenge, the Ministry could suggest that there is simply no
discrimination because claimants from countries not directly linked to Canada can always
present a «normal» immigration claim.   It is true that, should the claimant have advance
knowledge about the safe third country provision, she can apply for immigration status in
Canada instead of refugee status once she arrives in the safe third country. However, what
if she does not have this knowledge, arrives in Canada and pleads  refugee status? Her
application would be denied and she would  be returned. At that point she cannot switch
categories to «normal immigration candidate». In effect, two parallel systems are created:
one for immigrants, one for refugees: s. 57(1) of the Immigration Act. Moreover, even if
switching were possible, a refugee would likely be disadvantaged by the standards for a
successful immigration application which focus on wealth, education and linguistic ability,
not the threat of persecution. 
103. For example, as discussed earlier, the Latin American refugees who basically have no choice
but to pass through the United States en route to Canada. Doing so opens them up to the
unfair practices related to  Latin American refugees  scholars such as Torlai  have found to
be present within  American refugee policy: consult note  71 et seq. 
104. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 at 1333. Nevertheless, in this case Wilson J. held that «...it would be
stretching the imagination to characterize persons accused of one of the crimes listed in s.
427 of the Criminal Code in all the provinces except Alberta as members of a 'discrete and
insular minority'», at 1333. To this end, there are still clear limits to which groups can launch
Since this distinction involves an enumerated ground, a prima facie s.
15 violation is established.101 Nevertheless, this violation is further consolidated
if it is determined that the group receiving the differential treatment constitutes
a discrete and insular minority.102 In fact, this was a requirement under the
original  Andrews  test. The geography of refugee migration indicates that
refugee-nationals of countries not directly linked to Canada are disproportionate-
ly most needy of securing asylum in  Canada.103 To this end, the category of
persons differentially affected by the safe third country provision constitutes an
a priori disadvantaged group.
Nevertheless, even if this category does not  qualify as a discrete and
insular minority, recent Charter jurisprudence has held that an inability to
demonstrate membership in such a minority is not necessarily a bar to
establishing a s. 15 violation. For example, in  R. v. Turpin and Siddiqui,
Wilson J. held that proving the existence of a discrete and insular minority
would merely be helpful (as an «analytical  tool») to the success of the claim.104
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a claim under s. 15.
105. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906.
106. Not always. Although the Turpin approach to s. 15 was approved by Lamer J. in R. v.
Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259 at 275 and 311, in the most recent decision of the Supreme
Court on the matter -- Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 at
1043 --  L'Heureux-Dubé  J. held that the failure of the complainant to prove membership
in a «discrete and insular minority» was detrimental to his claim. 
107. P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 1992, Third Edition (Toronto: Carswell), para.
52.7(g).
Furthermore, in its 1990 decision in R. v. Hess, the Supreme Court held that s.
15 could be offended if a statute discriminated against men, clearly not a
«discrete and insular minority».105 This lessening of the requirements of the
original Andrews  test should make it easier for those not members of discrete
and insular minorities  to launch s. 15 claims, especially when the distinction
involves an enumerated ground.106 For his part, Peter Hogg maintains that, in
order to establish a s. 15 violation, it need only be shown that a law imposes a
disadvantage upon a person by reason of a named or analogous characteristic.107
II. THE «PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD» PROVISIONS
Bill C-86 provides that a person is not eligible to have the claim heard
by the Refugee Division if he has been determined by an adjudicator to be a
person described in s. 19(1)(c.1)(i) and if the Minister believes he constitutes a
danger to the Canadian public. S. 19(1)(c.1)(i) reads as follows:
«No person shall be granted admission who is a member of any of the
following classes:
(c.1) Persons who there are reasonable grounds  to believe 
(i) have been convicted outside Canada of an offence that, if commit-
ted in Canada, would constitute an offence that may be punishable
under any Act of Parliament by a maximum term of imprisonment of
ten years or more.»
Unlike the case with the safe third country  provisions, claimants are not
returned to a «safe place» to face a hearing, but are instead sent directly back to
their home countries, no matter how heinous the potential treatment they may
receive there. As with s. 46.01(1), these provisions are screening filters: instead
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108. These provisions work in tandem with many others in the Immigration Act designed to
reduce the numbers of «international criminals» granted immigration status in Canada. This
appears to be  a clear priority of the government. In matters of «normal» immigration, s.
19(1)(c.2) allows the SIO to expel any claimant it is reasonably believed was a member of
any organization that engaged in a pattern of criminal activity. Section 19(1)(c.1)(ii) is even
more sweeping: it allows the SIO to expel a claimant who it is reasonably believed has
committed outside Canada an offence recognized in Canada. Since these two provisions do
not apply to refugees, a discussion of their constitutionality falls outside the scope of this
essay. Nevertheless, this is an issue that should be addressed. However, this topic,  just like
the constitutionality of the provisions affecting refugee claimants, has so far attracted little
academic attention.
109. Hill  v.  Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1987), 1 Imm.L.R. (2d) 1. 
110. Ong  v.  Canada (1987), 3 Imm.L.R. (2d) 119.
111. Wong  v.  Canada (1989), 8 Imm.L.R. (2d) 16.
112. Crawford  v.  Minister of Employment and Immigration (1987), 3 Imm.L.R.(2d) 12.
of having one’s prior criminal record go to the substance of one’s actual claim,
it affects one’s admissibility in the entire process.108
This section is very similar to s. 19(1)(c) of the former Immigration Act
which denied permanent residence to individuals claiming immigration status
(generally persons from «safe» countries) who have a prior conviction.  Given
that the present  «prior criminal record» provisions affecting immigration
claimants and refugees are placed in the same section of the Act and encompass
the same wording, the intent of the legislature appears to be that the methodolo-
gy used to apply the former  s. 19(1)(c) is to be used in the application of
19(1)(c.1)(i). If this is the case, the effect of 19(1)(c.1) might constitute cruel
and unusual punishment or, at least, violate section 7. 
In applying subsection 1(c), courts had developed an equivalency test to
evaluate whether a foreign criminal offence should be recognized in Canada.109
Judicial review  also provided for a broad «fairness» duty in this area so that any
claimant could have an opportunity to make representations. Nevertheless,
despite the existence of these safeguards, immigration authorities have, in recent
years,  denied permanent residence applications on the basis that the applicant
had impersonated a chauffeur in Hong Kong in 1965110, that the applicant had
stolen the equivalent of $2.50 worth of goods111, and that the applicant had killed
an animal in 1959 with the intent to steal the carcass.112 These examples indicate
that the Ministry has a low standard of who «constitutes a danger to the public
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113. On another note, Bill C-86 does not indicate how the adjudicator  is to be selected, to whom
she is to be accountable, nor whether the SIO qualifies as one.
in Canada». In fact, it appears that once a conviction of any sort is proven, the
Minister is satisfied that the claimant constitutes a «danger». 
Nevertheless, the identically worded prior criminal record exclusionary
provision affects refugee claimants in a much different way than it does
immigration claimants.  The situation of a refugee is much more desperate than
a permanent residence applicant from a safe country since  the legal systems of
«unsafe» nations are often highly arbitrary. To this end,  it is much more tenuous
to rely upon convictions from  such states. Thus,  the judicial equivalency test
used in permanent residence  applications should certainly not be applied in the
context of the eligibility of a refugee. The present equivalency test has two
components:  (1) a comparison of the precise wording of each statute to
determine the essential ingredients of the respective offences; (2) the examina-
tion of the evidence before the adjudicator to ascertain whether that evidence is
sufficient to establish that the essential ingredients of the offence in Canada had
been proven.
Although this test may serve the limited purpose of assessing claims
from «safe» countries, its application in the context of refugee claimants will not
be sufficient to allow  section 19(1)(c.1)(i)  to satisfy section 7. This test  does
not evaluate whether the police actions and judicial procedures in the foreign
country conform at all to Canadian norms. No attention is paid to the origins of
the evidence used to satisfy the second branch of the equivalency test.
There is thus no requirement  that the conviction, in order to be relied
upon, must have been arrived at in a manner that comports with (or is even
loosely similar to) the Canadian understanding of fundamental justice.  No
one113 is mandated to ask whether the initial determination of guilt was made in
a fair trial, with right to counsel and the right to cross-examination of the
accusers. In this sense, a substantive decision regarding the fate of a refugee will
be made in Canada based on the result of a trial that could very well have
violated every right the Charter, common law or international criminal
Canada's new Immigration Act :
(1994) 24 R.D.U.S. an affront to the Charter and 417
Canada's collective conscience?
114. A persuasive argument  can be made that relying on potentially trumped up  foreign
convictions violates the Canadian sense of what is «fair, right and just» as set out  in Kindler.
115. (1991), 122 N.R. 228.
116. Re Shandi (1992), 17 Imm.L.R. (2d) 54 at 62.
117. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 380(1).
procedures give an accused. This even raises the spectre of a s. 12 violation.114
Furthermore,  there is no extraterritorial issue since the prior acts of the home
country government (in having convicted the claimant) might be the determining
factors in a decision made by the Canadian government affecting the claimant
while she is on  Canadian soil.
On a related note, what does «convicted» actually mean? In the recent
decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in M.E.I.  v.  Burgon, Linden J.A. held
that the term «convicted» (as used in section 19(1)(c) of the former  Act) means
«found guilty» after a plea of guilty or otherwise.115 Such a definition does not
recognize  the fact that threats of torture or punishment on family members are
regularly used in many countries to secure guilty pleas. Large numbers of
refugees flee their home countries to escape such governmental heavy-
handedness. Yet, when they arrive in Canada, they may be denied a refugee
hearing precisely due to criminal records stemming from this same heavy-
handedness. Instead of minimizing the damaging consequences a prior criminal
record might have,  Bill C-86  amplifies them. 
Moreover, what about the situation of an individual who has used false
documents to escape the home country and come to Canada? In the area of
immigration claimants from «safe» countries, the Federal Court has adopted the
position that the use of false documents indicates an intention to be subversive
in the host country.116 Technically, it also constitutes fraud, this being an offence
under the Criminal Code117.  If the same standard is applied to refugee
claimants, many persons will be turned back simply because the only way for
them to actually leave the home country was through falsified documents.
The provisions of section 19(1)(c.1)(i) are not absolute. There is one
important element of discretion. The officer or adjudicator can let  individuals
with a prior criminal record have their claims determined if he feels that they:
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118. Furthermore, the Act does not allow for a «compassionate and humanitarian» appeal from
the adjudicator's decision to deny refugee status due to a prior criminal record. S. 77(3) (S.C.
1991 c. I-2) provides such an  appeal to family class/sponsorship permanent residence
claimants whose applications are denied. The purpose of s. 77(3) is  «..to relieve against the
harshness and rigours of the letter of the law.»: Crawford, supra, note 112, at 21, per Vice-
Chair Townshend.  Absent such an appeal for denied refugee claimants, the Act is
inconsistent with  the pre-Charter  decision of the Supreme Court in Jiminez-Perez  v.
Canada, in which it was held that immigration officials are under a duty to grant every
applicant the opportunity to put forward the compassionate and humanitarian grounds in his
or her case: [1984] 2 S.C.R. 565.
119. Simpson v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1987), 3 Imm.L.R.(2d) 20; Tsang  v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) Imm. App. Bd., Doc. No. 83-6276.
«have satisfied the Governor in Council that they have rehabilitated
themselves and that at least five years have elapsed since the expira-
tion of any sentence imposed for the offence or since the commission
of the act or omission, as the case may be.»
Nevertheless, the provision is silent on some critical issues. For example,
the SIO appears to have complete discretion whether to solicit the Governor in
Council's opinion as to whether someone is «rehabilitated». Secondly, there is
no publication of any criteria on what «rehabilitated» actually means so
claimants are denied the chance to effectively prepare for this evaluation.118
With Singh as a precedent, the combined effect of these inadequacies infringes
section 7.
The «prior criminal record» provisions affecting permanent residence
claimants also contain a «five year waiting period and rehabilitation» exception
to the general rule barring such claimants from Canada. Case-law in this area
has held that the Governor in Council's decision in this matter must comport
with the principles of fundamental justice, which mandate that he or she have
available all the information necessary to make a rational and informed
decision.119 This should include the oral evidence of the applicant provided at
a hearing. Hopefully this standard will be  read into s. 19(1)(c.1)(i) and its
application to refugees. Yet, the overall procedure still remains inadequate if
hearings are mandatory to settle the question of rehabilitation yet not to
determine whether the prior criminal conviction was fairly obtained in the first
place. 
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120. See note 42.
121. Such an elasticity within s. 11 appears to have been in the minds of the drafters of the
Charter. It certainly has existed in the minds of judges. In Paruch v. Nova Scotia Nurses
Union (1991), 112 N.S.R. (2d) 100 at 108, Ryan L.J.S.C. allowed a complainant the use of
s. 11(d) in an administrative law matter involving the alleged failure of a union to fulfil its
duty of fair representation.
S. 11(d) mandates a «fair and public hearing»  -- not just a fair trial -- leading to the
conclusion that the s. 11 protections can apply to quasi-criminal and even administrative law
contexts. There is little case-law in this area, though, and the Supreme Court has not given
a meaning to «charged with an offence». However, in Canada v. Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R.
500 at 519, La Forest J. held that he was of the view that any meaning given to «person
charged with an offence» must be «constant throughout the section...one that harmonizes
with the various paragraphs of the section.» Since there is jurisprudence that a person
unfairly represented by her union is entitled to the use of s. 11(d) at a grievance hearing (and
is thus  a «person charged with an offence») there is no reason why all the provisions of s.
11 should not be made available to a refugee claimant.
Nevertheless, the case-law is not unanimous on this point. In Tyler v. MNR (1989), 89
D.T.C. 5044, it was held that s. 11 did not apply to the furnishing of tax information to the
Ministry of National Revenue. Moreover, in Brar v. Canada, 30 F.T.R. 284 at 300, an
intelligence/security  review for refugee purposes was determined to fall under the ambit of
s. 14, yet not that of s. 11.
122. A similar argument was rejected by the Federal Court of Appeal in Wong v. M.E.I. (1989),
97 N.R. 352 , yet no  supporting reasons were given. Further, this case involved a claim for
permanent residence, not refugee status, and is thus of limited precedental value vis-à-vis the
discussion at hand. What is relevant, however, is that the F.C.A. felt that the claimant's
conviction for having stolen  $2.00 worth of food from a Hong Kong supermarket
constituted a constitutional ground to deny her permanent residence claim. Bill C-86
stipulates that a refugee in the same position as Ms. Wong would be expelled to her home
country. 
S. 19(1)(c.1)(i) also touches on the Charter  section 11 right to a fair
proceeding. Although s. 11 only applies to «persons charged with an offence»,
if the section is given a liberal interpretation so as to cover a claimant awaiting
the quasi-penal120 decision of the SIO, the possibility that the Act violates s. 11
becomes apparent.121 More specifically, the «prior criminal record» provisions
can be said to infringe the 11(g) right not to be found «guilty» of any offence
unless it was an «offence under Canadian law»  or «criminal according to the
general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.»122  If there
are «procedural guarantees» within the terms «an offence under Canadian law»
or «the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations», then
rendering an unfavourable decision against a claimant in disregard of these
procedural guarantees potentially violates section 11(g).  Similarly, section 11(d)
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mandates that every hearing must be «fair» and this certainly includes
procedural guarantees. Public policy considerations require Canadian tribunals
to adhere to strict fairness considerations with regards to the type of evidence
that they can rely on. Determinations in the area of immigration matters with
similar (or even more serious) effects to criminal determinations cannot be
exempted from this norm.
These constitutional questions touch on important issues not only related
to immigration matters, but also the response of the global community to crime
more generally. As this response becomes increasingly international in focus, it
is imperative that it be based on assurances that individuals be fairly and
properly tried in their home countries before extradition or expulsion procee-
dings are triggered. 
III. BEING PART OF AN «ORGANIZATION ENGAGED IN ESPIO-
NAGE, SUBVERSION OR TERRORISM»
Any member of a group which engages in the subversion by force of  the
home government (even if fascistic) will not be granted admission to Canada.
Section 19(1)(e) stipulates that no  refugee determination hearing will be
awarded to:
«persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe are members
of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe
(A) will engage in acts of espionage or subversion against democratic
governments, institutions or processes, as they are understood in
Canada;
(B) engage in or instigate the subversion by force of any  government;
or
(C) engage in terrorism.»
 Although there is merit in the policy goal of keeping terrorists out of
Canada, s. 19(1)(e) overshoots its mark. Its effect would be to bar many refugee
claimants who had simply been politically active in their home countries. Many
«liberation organizations»  have violent factions. The African National Congress
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123. Hon. Doug Lewis, Hansard, 132:163 at 12536, June 22, 1992. 
or Sinn Fein  are but two examples. However, it is unfair to infer that every
individual associated with such an organization is somehow «dangerous». Yet
the new amendments do precisely this. Any member of an organization that has
engaged in  terrorist activity, even if the member had nothing to do with it, shall
be excluded from the Canadian refugee determination process.  S. 19(1)(e) thus
establishes an administrative requirement sufficiently unconnected to the actual
issue (the merit of the claim) so as to run counter to the substantive component
of fundamental justice. 
Moreover, there is no provision for any sort of hearing in which the
adjudicator or SIO could review the information or allow the claimant to
respond to any allegations. Furthermore, the discretion of the decision-maker is
absolute in this regard as the Act contains  no  specific  criteria specifying what
amount to «reasonable grounds» for a finding of membership in the organization
or whether the organization engaged in terrorist activity in the first place. In
practice, the determination of what organizations are to be classified as
«terrorist» is to be effected by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
(CSIS).123 To this end, whereas the «safe third country» provisions violate the
procedural guarantees of section 7 in part due to their rigidity, section 19(1)(e)
infringes the Charter due to the unfettered discretion it accords the SIO, CSIS
and the «adjudicator». 
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124. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
125. Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, per Wilson J.
126. Smith, supra, note 44, at 105 per McIntyre J. and at 149 per LeDain J.
127. Wilson J. (concurring) in R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 at 1034: «It would be a rare
provision which violate[s] the principles of fundamental justice and could nevertheless be
justified under s. 1.» Consult also the decision of Sopinka J. in Kindler, supra, note 33, at
18. 
128. P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 1992, Third Edition (Toronto: Carswell), para.
35.14(c), p. 886.
IV. JUSTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE CHARTER
Section 1 provides that Charter  rights can be subject to limits deemed
to be reasonable in a free and democratic  society». The test to establish whether
a statutory provision constitutes a «reasonable limit»  was first delineated by
former Chief Justice Dickson in The Queen v. Oakes.124  A limitation to a
constitutional guarantee will be sustained if two conditions are satisfied. Firstly,
the objective of the legislation must be pressing and substantial. Secondly, the
means chosen to attain this legislative end must be reasonable and demonstrably
justifiable. In order to satisfy the second requirement, the rights violation must
be rationally connected to the aim of the legislation, the impugned provision
must minimally impair the Charter guarantee, and there must be a proportionali-
ty between the effect of the measure and its objective so that the attainment of
the legislative goal is not outweighed by the abridgement of the right.
The determination of a «reasonable limit» is a highly contextual
process.125 The rigidity or even the application of the Oakes test also depends on
which Charter right has been violated. For example, a review of Charter
jurisprudence indicates that courts are often  willing to perceive denials of
section 15 as «reasonable limits». On the other hand, section 12 has been held
to be an absolute right, a violation thereof thus not capable of being upheld
under section 1.126 An infringement of section 7 will also  be difficult to uphold
under s. 1.127  In fact, no such infringement has ever been justified as a section
1 «reasonable limit».128 Since Bill C-86's most evident Charter  violations are
those of ss. 7 and 12, the contextual approach makes it more difficult to uphold
the legislation under s. 1.
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129. The Republic of Argentina v.  Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536; United States of America  v.
Allard and Charette (1987), 40 D.L.R. (4th) 102 at 110 (S.C.C.).
130. Mellino, supra, note 129, at 555-6. 
131. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at 459.
132. «It is fair to say that refugee determination is a world-wide problem. We need international
co-operation to address the root causes of this mass migration», Doug Lewis, Solicitor
General, Hansard, 132:163 at 12533, June 22, 1992. 
However, demonstrating the constitutionality of Bill C-86 may be
facilitated  by the recent Chiarelli  decision, in which  Mr. Justice Sopinka
emphasized that immigration policy is replete with competing interests and
suggested that curial deference be awarded to Parliament in this area. The
«deferential approach» often arises when the courts are called upon to evaluate
the contents of Canada’s foreign policy, of which immigration law is a subset.
In Allard   and  Mellino, La Forest J. emphasized that the courts should exercise
extreme caution in interfering with the executive’s pre-eminent position in
matters of external relations.129 The point was made that the executive has much
greater expertise than the court in the area of foreign affairs.130  However, is it
not the courts that have both the expertise and the duty to ensure that Charter
rights be respected?  Furthermore, as stated by Dickson J. (as he then was) in
Operation Dismantle  v. The Queen, «...disputes of a foreign policy nature may
be properly cognizable by the courts.»131
a) SAFE THIRD COUNTRY
The Ministry affirms  two overarching objectives to the safe third
country provisions: (1) to give effect to a co-ordinated interstate response to the
refugee crisis so as to promote comity among nations132; (2) to expedite and
streamline the refugee determination process in order to cut  down «abuse» and
promote meritorious claims. 
i) CO-ORDINATED INTERSTATE APPROACH
Even if the promotion of a co-ordinated interstate approach is a pressing
and substantial concern, s. 46.01(1) does not pass the second tier of the Oakes
test.  The fact that s. 46.01(1) the Act  is to be administered in so mechanical a
way fails to minimally impair the rights of the refugee claimants as they have no
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133. Statistics taken from a document published by the Metro Toronto Host Program in 1992
entitled New Immigration Law Will Keep Refugees Out. 
134. 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (No. 2545).
opportunity to show whether the «safe third country» is actually safe for them.
Without such an opportunity, refugees risk an arbitrary return to their home
country. It is difficult to grasp how this could constitute a «reasonable» limit of
a fundamental human right. 
The violation of the ss. 7, 12 and 15 rights of refugee claimants could not
be justified under the policy objective of «the promotion of comity among
nations» since there is no rational connection between the stated objective of the
statute and s. 46.01(1). For example, the implementation of the «safe third
country» provision shall force the United States to hear even more refugee
claims than it presently does. In the past, tens of thousands of claimants
(especially from Latin America) used the U.S.A. as a springboard to file a claim
in Canada. Since s. 46.01(1) eliminates this possibility for most refugees the
number of refugee claimants in the United States shall increase. Such unilateral
action on Canada's part could in fact disturb (and not promote) the political
relationship between Canada and the U.S.A. 
What if the «home country» refuses to accept the claimant in question?
This individual will then become a «refugee in orbit» and no-one will adjudicate
his claim. This does not help rationalize an international problem; if anything,
it  creates a new one. The Metro Toronto Host Program estimates that 60% of
refugees arriving at Canada’s borders pass through the United States or Western
Europe.133 These individuals will no longer be ex facie entitled to have their
claims heard in Canada. Thus, instead of sharing the burden,  Bill C-86  shifts
more of Canada’s responsibilities onto other nations,  violating the Geneva
Convention’s affirmation that «states shall do everything within their power to
prevent the  refugee problem from becoming a cause of tension between
states.»134
Moreover, it is hardly a co-ordinated interstate approach to place the
entire responsibility of accommodating refugees on the country most geographi-
cally proximate to them. Along with transportation contingencies, there are
many other reasons why refugees might not want to seek asylum in the first
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135. Thanks to Susan MacDonald, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto,  for this insight as well
as the point about the differential  effects of Bill C-86 on  women refugees.  
136. The mechanical nature of the exclusionary provision will disproportionately exclude those
unable to afford to come to Canada directly from their home country or those unable to
prove to the Canadian government that they have the skills or education to support
themselves as independent immigrants. Systemic discrimination in many refugee-producing
countries has resulted in women having fewer monetary resources and less education than
men.   
137. Thanks to Lara Friedlander for this point.
138. Section 77(1) of the Act. Details of these conditions precedent are found in the Regulations.
139. It is unclear what this actually means in practice. Its use could in fact become arbitrary. 
140. For example same-sex  and common law couples, single persons, and refugees without blood
relatives in Canada.  
country they flee to. Involuntary migrants seek family and communities who can
provide both emotional as well as financial support as they attempt to stabilize
their lives.135 Poorer refugees -- often women -- will be the most affected by the
exclusion provision.136 By obliging such persons to definitively seek refugee
status in the first «safe» country in which they arrive, section 46.01(1) might
preclude them from joining the members of their families who have already
relocated and settled down in a new home.
In response the Minister could suggest that refugees temporarily in
«safe» countries who have family already in Canada would be able to have these
family members sponsor them as «family class» immigrants.137 Unfortunately,
the protection offered to these persons by the «family sponsorship» sections of
the Immigration Act  is far from complete. There are several conditions
precedent  that, if left unsatisfied, serve as grounds for the Immigration Officer
to deny the sponsorship application.138 For example, the family members in
Canada might not be able to undertake the required 5 year commitment to
provide all necessary care and maintenance to the claimant. The nominee must
also demonstrate that she will be able to «establish herself successfully» in
Canada.139 Only certain family members (spouse, parent, child, siblings, and in
some cases more distant relatives) are eligible to sponsor, thereby disadvanta-
ging certain claimants regardless of the urgency of their refugee situation.140 On
a broader scale, it is a non-solution to argue that the refugee determination
system can be rolled back because refugees can always use the regular
immigration procedures. The regular immigration provisions were not designed
to deal with the special needs of refugees. 
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141. Refugee Affairs Division, Refugee Perspectives, 1987-88, (Ottawa: The Division, 1988) at
36.
142. Hansard, 132:163 at 12507, June 22, 1992.
143. The Oakes test is summarized earlier in this essay in the text following note 124.  
ii) EXPEDITING AND STREAMLINING THE PRO-
CESS
The second legislative objective of Bill C-86's «safe third country»
provision has two wrinkles to it:  to ensure that the process set out by the
Convention Refugee Determination Division is not abused and that genuine
refugees in need of protection be quickly admitted on a cost-effective basis.141
Jack Shields, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of  Employment
and Immigration, sums up the government's position on the «abuse» issue:
«What we are trying to stop and what we are going  to stop are the
bogus claims that are made.»142
For the purposes of s. 1, the burden of proof that the government must
discharge is that there are sufficient numbers of «bogus» and «abusive» refugee
claims so as to characterize the reduction of these claims as a concern of
«pressing and substantial» importance. On numerous occasions during the
committee stages of Bill C-86  the government was called upon to supply some
evidence leading to such a finding. No convincing  evidence was presented.  To
this end, this justification fails to pass the first stage of the Oakes  test.143
The second wrinkle involves time management and economics. The
Ministry felt  that continuing to administer  hearings to all claimants would
simply be too expensive given the recessionary nature of the Canadian economy.
If the government seeks a justification for the safe third country provision in the
realm of administrative efficiency and expediency, its attention must be drawn
to the judgement of Wilson J. in Singh:
«The guarantees of the Charter would be illusory if they could be
ignored because it was administratively convenient to do so. No doubt
considerable time and money can be saved by adopting administrative
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144. Singh, supra, note 6, 58 N.R. at 69. The same point was echoed by the Supreme Court in R.
v.  Schwartz, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 443 at 472.
145. Statistics taken from a document published by the Metro Toronto Host Program in 1992
entitled New Immigration Law Will Keep Refugees Out. 
146. Since 30,000 out of the 44,000 claimants arriving to Canada in 1992 «passed through» safe
third countries and  the new provisions could exclude almost all of them, a figure of 68% is
arrived at. 
147. The solution lies not in expelling large numbers of  claimants as soon as they arrive. There
are more constructive approaches. For example, an effort might be made  to reducing certain
steps in the permanent residence determination process, given that the consequences on the
applicants are less severe. This could allow more Immigration Officers to sit on refugee
procedures which ignore the principles of fundamental justice, but
such an argument, in my view, misses the point of the exercise under
s. 1.»144
Even if administrative expediency constituted a «pressing and substan-
tial» objective, the numbers of refugees arriving at Canada’s borders are hardly
large enough to warrant the drastic «weeding out» measures proposed by Bill C-
86. Once again, the legislation fails the second tier of the Oakes test by
overshooting its mark.  In 1992, only 44,000 refugee claimants arrived at
Canada’s  borders, 30,000 of these arriving through safe third countries. This is
far lower than most European countries whose population densities are much
higher than Canada’s. According to the Metro Toronto Host Program, in 1991
Canada received 1.11 asylum seekers for every 1000 Canadians. This can be
compared to 6.3 for Switzerland, 3.6 for Austria, 3.3 for Germany and 3.18 for
Sweden.145 Canada even receives fewer refugee claimants per capita  than many
developing countries. Yet Bill C-86 could  reduce the number of refugee
claimants allowed to present their claim in Canada  by as much as 68%!146  If
any backlog has arisen within the refugee determination system, it seems unfair
to eliminate the government’s own prior inefficiency at the expense of
fundamental justice for future claimants.
However, one legitimate goal within the domain of administrative
expediency  is the reduction of the review process for refugee claimants. At
present, there is a lag of about 14 months between arrival in Canada and the
final decision regarding the claim.  The Ministry, through Bill C-86, seeks  to
reduce  this to an average of 6 months. Nevertheless, this goal can be more
effectively attained through means less intrusive than Bill C-86.147
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cases, thus allowing for more hearings to take place at the same time.  Another approach
would be to reallocate judicial and administrative resources to Refugee Determination
Boards and away from other public tribunals due to the heightened seriousness of the
consequences of refugee decisions.
In The Queen v. Chaulk (1990), 62 C.C.C. (3d) 193, Lamer C.J.C. lessened the stringency
of the «least restrictive means» test. He held at 221 that «when assessing the alternative
means which were available to Parliament, it is important to consider whether a less intrusive
means would achieve the same objective as effectively». The alternative means suggested
to reduce the «waiting period», since they attain the legislative goal just as effectively,
indicate that Bill C-86 does not satisfy even the less stringent s. 1 test found in Chaulk. 
148. A hidden policy objective could be the keeping out of Canada of politically involved
dissidents.
149. Hon. Doug Lewis, Solicitor General, Hansard, 132:163 at 12533, June 22, 1992.
150. Jack Shields, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Employment and Immigration,
Hansard, 132:163 at 12504-5, June 22, 1992.
b) PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD AND SUBVERSIVE
ORGANIZATION
The objective of the «prior criminal record»  and «subversion»
provisions is the preservation of Canadian national security148:
«We are not going to become as a country a safe haven for retired or
active terrorists...the legislation is going to close the door on those
individuals... [and] assist the RCMP and other police forces in their
battle with organized crime.»149
«[The former Immigration Act] put the very safety and security of
Canadians at risk...we have to face the fact that the world of the
1990's is a world of increasingly sophisticated, internationally
organized criminals and terrorists. New measures will strengthen the
definition of criminal inadmissibility and allow us to keep out
people...known to be part of a terrorist organization. They will give
Immigration Officers the authority to refuse entry to anyone involved
in [these] activities.»150
However, section 19(1)(c.1)(i)  is not rationally connected to this
objective as no allowance is made to determine whether those claimants kept out
of Canada have been fairly convicted (and hence whether they are actually
«criminal»). The second tier of the Oakes  test is thus not satisfied.  Nor is the
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152. 36 D.L.R. (3d) 522 at 531.
153. Consult note 123.
effect of the legislation proportionate to its goal. The number of  international
criminals trying  to enter Canada (as in the recent case of the Hong Kong triad
members151)  is simply not sufficient to require such a drastic measure.
Moreover, even if the numbers were sufficient, legislative drafters cannot
assume that foreign countries have fair judicial proceedings just so that
Canadian immigration procedures can be expedited.  It is imperative to keep in
mind the words of Laskin J. (as he then was) in his 1973 judgement in  Minister
of Manpower and Immigration  v.  Brooks :
«[The law of another country] cannot be controlling in relation to an
inquiry about criminal convictions to determine whether immigration
to Canada should be permitted.»152
The same shortcoming affects s. 19(1)(e). Although it may be «demons-
trably justifiable» to expel someone known to have personally engaged in
terrorism, Bill C-86 overshoots its mark by excluding anyone simply believed
to be part of an organization having engaged in CSIS's153 definition of «subver-
sive terrorism».  
In conclusion, although  immigration policy involves balancing the
interests of  the individual claimant and the state, these are not necessarily at
odds with each other. Fair hearings in which claims are entitled to be properly
presented maximizes fundamental justice for all refugees. Such a procedure
allows the most meritorious claimants to enter Canada and not be excluded on
the basis of connecting flights or unfair convictions. In the long run the state,
too, benefits from this.
D. FILLING THE VOID
If s. 46.01(1), 19(1)(c.1)(i) and 19(1)(e) of the Immigration Act are
struck down as unconstitutional, a void is created. Although the Act will
continue to apply, it shall do so without any provisions governing the admissibi-
Canada's new Immigration Act :
430 an affront to the Charter and (1994) 24 R.D.U.S.
Canada's collective conscience?
154. R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577.
155. (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 495 (C.A.). 
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lity of certain classes of refugee claimants that it had hitherto excluded. This
may  very well be the intention of the courts, as a situation is created in which
persons arriving from «safe third countries» and with «prior convictions» are
allowed to enter the refugee determination system, with the possibility that these
factors operate to affect the actual merit based decision as to whether Canada
should award  them refugee asylum. However, a more constructive solution
might take the form of judicial intervention so as to preserve the constitutionali-
ty of the impugned legislation.
There are two possible approaches. In R. v. Seaboyer154, McLachlin J.,
after striking down s. 276 of the Criminal Code, replaced it with a set of
judicially created guidelines she suggested would have to be incorporated into
any future legislation on the subject of  restrictions on the use of prior sexual
history of complainants in sexual assault cases in order for these to sustain
Charter scrutiny.
However, in other situations courts have gone even further and have
actually «read in» terms to statutory provisions. In  Haig v. Canada155 the
Ontario Court of Appeal inserted clauses into a statute in order to preserve its
constitutionality. In fact, this approach has been sanctioned by the Supreme
Court  in its 1992 decision in Schachter  v. Canada.156  Although a highly
efficient  form of remedying constitutional wrongs, serious concerns can be
raised with regard to how comfortable we may be with the judiciary acting as
pseudo-legislatures. The Supreme Court was sensitive to this issue in Schachter.
Lamer J. outlined a procedure to be followed  should only part of a statute or
provision violate the Constitution.157 This procedure stipulates that  the courts
should only «read in» when such activity does not change the nature of the
legislative scheme in question.  In a difficult situation (as was the case in
Schachter itself), the court should feel free to strike down the unconstitutional
provision yet suspend the declaration of invalidity so as to give the government
time to respond.
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The «guidelines» or «reading in» approach might be particularly
applicable in the case of Bill C-86 due to the fact that any potential Charter
violations could be remedied through the insertion of procedural and other
protections into the Act. For example, courts could «read in» a requirement to
seek assurances from the «safe third country» as to the holding of a fair hearing.
On a similar note, if  rights to hearings, counsel, interpreters and appeals were
included in both s. 46.01(1) and 19(1)(c.1)(i), then the requirements of
fundamental justice under Singh and Hofer would be met. The introduction of
a sensitive  equivalency of procedures test might also inject fundamental justice
into the «prior conviction» exclusion as well as eliminate the possibility that
cruel and unusual punishment could result from returning a claimant to her place
of origin due to a fraudulent conviction.
This judicial approach could guarantee refugee claimants Charter rights
while at the same time enabling the government to pursue the legitimate policy
goals behind the Immigration Act. These include the maintenance of internatio-
nal comity in the area of refugee law, cutting down the waiting period for
refugee claims to be processed,  and recognizing that a globally co-ordinated
response to refugee claimants is preferable over an amalgam of disjointed
national ones.  However, if the effect of «reading in» would be to significantly
change the nature of the refugee determination scheme beyond the intentions of
the  legislature, then  the Schachter «suspended declaration of invalidity» might
be a better way to proceed. This would empower Parliament to maintain the
constitutionality of Bill C-86 through means it is comfortable with or even
invoke its power under the notwithstanding clause.
E. CONCLUSION
The «safe third country» and «prior criminal record» amendments to the
Immigration Act  proposed by Bill C-86 appear to violate some of the Charter's
cardinal principles.   It is ironic that the Act  parrots the guarantees of the
Geneva Convention in matters of refugee determination yet  circumvents these
by keeping claimants outside of the refugee determination process in the first
place.158
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Immigration law is rapidly becoming a central focus of public policy
debate  in Canada. Within this debate importance should be attributed to the fact
that a balance must be maintained between any restructuring of Canada’s
immigration policies and the rights accorded refugees by the Charter and the
Geneva Convention. In this sense, these rights documents can serve a pivotal
role in helping governments develop legislative initiatives that are better tailored
to their policy goals, thereby promoting both the individual as well as collective
interests. 
The same government (in fact, the same Minister, Bernard Valcourt) that
passed Bill C-86 was  persuaded in March 1993 to allow «violence against
women» to be a reason supporting a claim of refugee status in Canada.159 This
shows the potential effect of public lobbying. In a similar spirit, political
pressure or legal challenges could help rework  s. 46.01(1) and s. 19(1)(c.1)(i)
and thus ensure that Canada’s integrity in the area of refugee policy be
maintained.
